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INTRODUCTION

As a child, you probably heard it all: "If everyone else jumped off a
bridge, would you jump, too?;" or "Two wrongs do not make a right;"
or perhaps the all-time favorite, "I don't know; ask your father."
These simple sayings basically characterize the current judicial and
legislative status of the law regarding confidential communications
made by a child to a parent. Only one state currently recognizes the
privilege at common law;' only two states have enacted legislation
1. See John Caher, New York Commission Ponders Parent-ChildPrivilege, LEINTELLIGENCER, Nov. 10, 2000, at 4 (stating that "New York has no statutory
parent-child privilege," but the "courts have recognized a common law privilege
solely derived from the constitutional right of privacy"); Margaret Graham Tebo, Parent Privilege: Lawmakers Seek to Protect Parent-Child Conversation, A.B.A. J., July
GAL

2000, 18, 18 (2000).
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granting the privilege;2 and many court decisions have said that if the
privilege is to be granted, it should be created by the legislative
branch, not the judicial branch.' One thing our parents never had to
say to us when we sought their advice and guidance was: "Anything
you say may be used against you in a court of law."4 However, as
more parents are called to testify against their children in grand jury
proceedings, criminal trials, and juvenile proceedings,5 that warning
may soon become the mantra of parents in almost every state.
2. IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Michie Supp. 1997) (stating that child-to-parent communications "concerning matters in any civil or criminal action to which such child or
ward is a party" are privileged, subject to exceptions); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02(1)(j) (West 2000) (stating that child-to-parent communications "made in confidence by the minor to the minor's parent" are privileged, subject to exceptions); cf
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2000). While Massachusetts has a statute
that may be used to prevent a child from testifying against a parent, the privilege is
not reciprocal and is considered by some to not be a privilege, but rather, a witness
disqualification rule. See Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit: No Parent-ChildPrivilege,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 13, 1997, at 1 ("The Massachusetts statute also does not
create a testimonial privilege ... but 'rather it is best described as a witness-disqualification rule,' because the statute only bars a minor child, under certain circumstances,
from testifying against a parent, and does not extend to children of all ages in all
circumstances.") (quoting In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1147 n.13 (3d Cir. 1997)).
But see Catherine B. Sarson, Comment, The Child-Parent Testimonial Privilege: Attempts at Codification Have Missed Their Mark, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 861, 862 &
n.7 (1999) (including Massachusetts as one of "[t]hree states [that] have codified this
privilege," which she terms "a child-parent privilege").
3. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1147 n.13 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[W]e believe the
recognition of such a privilege, if one is to be recognized, should be left to Congress."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 722 N.E.2d 450, 451 (Mass. 2000); see also Betsy
Booth, Comment, Underprivileged Communications: The Rationale for a Parent-Child
Testimonial Privilege, 36 Sw. L.J. 1175, 1190 (1983) (stating that some "state courts
have recognized the reasons for the privilege, but have deferred to the legislature
creation of the privilege").
4. Tebo, supra note 1, at 18.
5. See State v. Grossberg, No. IN96-12-01.27, 1998 WL 117975, at *1 (Del. Super.
Ct. Jan. 23, 1998); Daniel J. Capra, Laws of Evidentiary Privilege, N.Y. L.J., May 8,
1998, at 3, 39 (stating that "[t]he absence of any parent-child privilege became a matter of public and political outcry when Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed Monica Lewinsky's mother to testify before the District of Columbia grand
jury"); see also Caher, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Michael J. Hutter, Law Review
Commission member and professor at Albany Law School as saying, "'There have
been numerous instances over the years in which prosecutors have subpoenaed children to testify against the parents, parents to testify against their kids .... We recognize that many times legitimate law enforcement needs will demand that, but to do it
on a routine basis seems very unseemly'"); Richard Connelly, More Teen-Agers Being
Taken to the Adult Woodshed: Harris County's Republican Judges Are Getting Tough
on Violent Juvenile Crime-Too Tough, Say Some Defense Lawyers, TEX. LAW., Jan.
29, 1996, at 2 ("'We take the position of listening to the victims and the families of
victims, not of the defendants.... For the families it's a punishment issue. They see
these crimes as being so heinous that they should be punished and we shouldn't be
worried about the consequences to [the defendants]!"') (alteration in original) (quoting Elizabeth Godwin, Chief Prosecutor of the Juvenile Division for Harris County,
Texas); E-mail from Ed Kinkeade, Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District, Dallas,
Texas, to David L. Cheatham (Jan. 10, 2001, 08:37:40 CST) ("In adult cases I can
recall parents testifying as State's witnesses, even in at least one capital case. Prosecu-
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This Comment addresses the need for a narrowly tailored, statutorily created privilege protecting confidential communications made to
a parent by a child who is seeking advice or guidance and how crucial
that privilege has become for today's juveniles, who face tougher
guidelines for juvenile sentencing and adult certification. Part II provides an overview of the historical background of the parent-child
privilege and its current legal status, both at the state and federal
levels. Part III explains how the "get-tough" legislation that has made
juvenile courts parallel to adult courts, along with the movement to
completely abolish juvenile courts, necessitates legislative approval of
a parent-child privilege. Part IV discusses past proposals for parentchild privileges that have failed and proposes that the reason for their
failure is that the proposals were overly broad. Finally, Part V proposes a narrowly tailored statute designed to protect only those confidential communications from the child to the parent when the child is
seeking parental guidance or advice.

II.

OVERVIEW OF THE PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE

A.

General Overview of Privileges

A privilege is "a limitation on admissibility which the courts or the
legislature have deemed necessary to protect some other compelling
interest."6 "Evidentiary privileges... may, depending on the state, be
enacted by the legislature, established by the courts, or in the same
jurisdictions instituted by either. Federal courts are authorized under
the Federal Rules of Evidence to recognize privileges in accordance
with common law" 7 and "in the light of reason and experience."8
"Privileges are generally disfavored because they often suppress otherwise reliable evidence and thus impede the discovery of truth."9
Therefore, "[t]he rules of privilege are a reflection of the historic tension between the high importance given to fact-finding in the legal

tors in my experience will call any witness that will help prove their case.") (on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review). But see David A. Schlueter, The Parent-Child
Privilege: A Response to Calls for Adoption, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 35, 54 (1987). Mr.

Schlueter claims that "[f]ew prosecutors are willing to incur public wrath and criticism
for needless use of testimony of either a child or a parent against the other," and that
"the fear of abuse is simply not sufficiently well-founded to justify the codification of
a parent-child privilege." Id. While Mr. Schlueter offers no proof for the first of
these two assertions, assuming, arguendo, its validity in 1987, the recent trend appears
to be otherwise.
6. Schlueter, supra note 5, at 37.
7. Need for Parent/ChildPrivilege, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 1998, at 10.
8. FED. R. EvID. 501 advisory committee's note; see also In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11,
16 (2d Cir. 1993).
9. Schlueter, supra note 5, at 38.
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process and the impediment to that goal created by developing human
values and priorities."" °
In order to be recognized at common law, the relationship usually 1
must meet the four requirements established by Dean Wigmore:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than12 the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
The underlying policy behind privileges is that there are some "relationship[s] that society deems more important than the search for
truth in a court proceeding."1 3 Examples of acceptable relationships
that have traditionally fallen into this category are relationships between attorney and client, husband and wife, and penitent and
clergy. 14
B.

HistoricalPerspective

The debate over parent-child privileges has been ongoing for over
twenty years. 15 "This issue was the topic of much scholarly discourse
in the late seventies and early eighties, but eventually faded from the
spotlight."' 6 Although most commentators support its conclusion,17
10. David 0. Boehm, Lawyer's Bookshelf, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J. 51, 51 (2000) (reviewing LAWRENCE N. GRAY, EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES (GRAND JURY, CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL TRIALS) (1999)).
11. See Shonah P. Jefferson, Note, The Statutory Development of the Parent-Child
Privilege: Congress Responds to Kenneth Starr's Tactics, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429,
436-37 & n.55 (1999) (acknowledging that while in some situations the communications between husband and wife do not meet all of Wigmore's conditions, courts have
still recognized the marital privilege because of important policy reasons).
12. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285, at
527 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted).
13. Booth, supra note 3, at 1176; see also IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Michie 1998) (stating that "[t]here are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate").
14. FED. R. EViD. 501 advisory committee's note; TEX. R. EVID. 503; Caher, supra
note 1, at 4.
15. See Sarson, supra note 2, at 861; see also Caher, supra note 1, at 4 ("The Law
Review Commission, an agency established in 1934 to examine New York statutes and
advise the Legislature on areas where it believes reforms are warranted, has been
calling for some form of child-parent privilege for nearly 20 years.").
16. Sarson, supra note 2, at 861 (footnote omitted).
17. E.g., Schlueter, supra note 5, at 45 (acknowledging that "virtually every commentator addressing the issue has urged either legislative or judicial adoption of a
parent-child privilege").
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the privilege covering the parent-child18relationship has not gained
widespread judicial or legislative favor.
Some proponents of the parent-child privilege argue the necessity
of the privilege because of the "cruel trilemma" of requiring a parent
to testify against his or her child. 9 The parent can either (1) testify
against her child, thereby breaching the confidence the child has
placed in her and risking damage to the relationship with her child; (2)
commit perjury, thereby setting a bad example for her child; or (3)
refuse to testify, thereby risking contempt of court.2z While these are
difficult choices, one opponent has made the compelling argument
that the mere discomfort and difficulty of being placed in such a situation does not justify the privilege. 2 ' While the cruel trilemma in its
entirety may not justify the parent-child privilege, it is the court's forcing a parent to involuntarily breach the confidence of the child and
the resulting damage from that breach that forms the basis of most
proponents' primary argument.2 2
Proponents of the parent-child privilege argue that the privilege fosters "important public policy interests such as the protection of strong
and trusting parent-child relationships; the preservation of the family;
safeguarding of privacy interests and protection from harmful government intrusion; and the promotion of healthy psychological development of children. ' 23 They fear that forced disclosure of confidences
will damage the relationship between the parent and the child, resulting in fewer future communications and possibly resulting in additional delinquent behavior from the child.2 4 "[P]arental influence is
probably the most important factor in a child's emotional development. 2z5 Thus, proponents feel that a parent-child privilege is warranted because encouragement and protection of "the important
family values of trust and open communication between parent and
18. See supra notes 1-2; see also 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
ch. 501, at 501-34 to 501-35 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2001) (stating that "[m]ost federal courts that have addressed the issue
have declined to recognize a parent-child privilege," and that "[t]he two district courts
that have recognized the privilege have not been followed by any other federal
court") (footnotes omitted).
19. See Schlueter, supra note 5, at 54-55; Jefferson, supra note 11, at 442-43.
20. Schlueter, supra note 5, at 54.
21. Id. at 55.
22. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Tebo, supra
note 1, at 18 (stating that "[s]uch an intrusion seems contrary to the political focus on
family values"); Booth, supra note 3, at 1178 (stating Dean Wigmore's test "raisels]
considerations of the importance and fragility of the family unit" and that a parentchild privilege should protect the privacy interests of the parents in raising and educating the child).
23. Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1146.
24. Booth, supra note 3, at 1178 (stating that "sociological research indicates that
juvenile delinquency may be related to a lack of communication within the family").
25. Susan Levine, Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 771, 781 (1979).
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
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child" 6 outweigh the evidentiary benefit gained by forced disclosure
in grand jury or court proceedings.27 As an attorney who represented
the parents of a sixteen-year-old child accused of rape reasoned, "'Society as a whole encourages a kid in trouble to go to the parents, and
28
we need to protect that above all else."'
Opponents of the parent-child privilege argue that the second element of the Wigmore test2 9 is not satisfied because most children and
parents are not aware of the privilege's existence or non-existence;
thus, these opponents feel that adding the privilege will do nothing to
foster the open communication between a parent and child.3" The argument, however, apparently "lacks empirical support."3 1 At least
one proponent has conceded that perhaps the idea has "logical appeal,
however, since the average layman presumably is not concerned with
the law of evidence, '3 2 but the proponent still argues that even without specific knowledge of the privilege, "a family member ... may
well believe that family confidences will remain private. ' 33 Furthermore, in today's more litigious society, the "average layman" may
34
have a much better understanding of the law than in years past.
26. Need for Parent/ChildPrivilege, supra note 7, at 10; see also Booth, supra note
3, at 11.78 (stating that communication between the child and parent is necessary in
order for the parent to teach the child values and morals and that a child "will not
trust a parent" with future confidential communications if that trust is broken by a
parent's forced testimony).
27. Need for Parent/ChildPrivilege, supra note 7, at 10.
28. Tebo, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting attorney John C. Koslowsky); see generally
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 722 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. 2000).
29. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
30. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152-53 (3d Cir. 1997); Booth, supra note
3, at 1179; Schlueter, supra note 5, at 56 (stating that "there is little reason to believe
that the parent and child would ever depend on such a privilege in making statements
to one another").
31. Booth, supra note 3, at 1180 & n.43 (noting that Mark Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives:A Critical Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1372-74 (1973)
(observing that this proposition originated in Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV.
675, 682 (1929), but lacked supporting authority) the idea caught on, but has apparently never been supported with empirical data).
32. Id. at 1180.
33. Id.
34. In a random survey of adults working in non-legal careers, twenty-four respondents were asked, "Are you aware that in Texas, there is a spousal privilege, such that
in most circumstances, a spouse will not be made to testify against the other spouse in
a criminal proceeding (the so-called 'spousal exception')?" Sixteen respondents answered, "yes," that they were aware, and eight respondents answered "no." In question two, the same respondents were told to "suppose the following hypothetical: You
are a parent, and your minor child comes to you seeking guidance and confides that
he has committed a criminal act. May you claim a parental privilege and refuse to
testify against your son?" Seven respondents answered, "yes," that they could claim a
parental privilege, and seventeen respondents answered "no." While the survey did
not include enough respondents to be conclusive, it is interesting to note that 66.7%
of respondents answered question one correctly, and 70.8% answered question two
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Opponents also argue that the parent-child privilege does not meet
the fourth requirement of the Wigmore test. They believe that any
injury to the parent-child relationship resulting from the disclosure
"would be relatively insignificant" while "the impairment of the truthseeking function" would be substantial.36 Proponents, on the other
hand, dispute this claim, citing the damage to the relationship from
lost trust as well as the damage to the social and emotional development of the child.37
C. Current Status of Parent-ChildPrivilege: Confusing Terminology
Used in a Broad and General Sense Equals a Detriment to Judicial
Creation of the More Narrow Parent-Child Confidential
Communications Privilege

Discussion of a parent-child privilege can become confusing at best,
due largely in part to the vast amount of varying material that has
been written, legislated,38 or adjudicated on the topic. 39 There are two

separate possibilities when speaking generally of parent-child privilege: one refers to the more narrow confidential communications
privilege, and one refers to the broader testimonial privilege.4" The
confidential communications privilege protects only those private
communications made in confidence4 1 while the testimonial privilege

allows "a witness [to] refuse to give [any] adverse testimony against
[her] parent or child."42 Within each of these two categories, one
must distinguish between referring to acts or communications as between parent-to-child, child-to-parent, or both.4 3 Because the parent-

child privilege is often discussed in very general terms, the distinction
can become confusing.
correctly. This may indicate that people in today's society are more aware of legal
issues. (Survey on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review.) An in-depth study,
beyond the scope of this Comment, should be conducted by parties on both sides of
the issue.
35. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2285, at 527; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
36. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1153 (3d Cir. 1997); Schlueter, supra note
5, at 57.
37. See Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1208-09 (Mass. 1983)
(O'Conner, J.,
dissenting); Sarson, supra note 2, at 868; see also Amee A. Shah, Comment, The Parent-ChildTestimonial Privilege-Hasthe Time for It Finally Arrived?, 47
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 41, 44 (1999) (stating that "the parent-child privilege arguably
passes these tests").
38. See supra note 2.
39. See infra note 62.
40. Capra, supra note 5, at 39; Schlueter, supra note 5, at 43 (calling the testimonial privilege "the privilege not to take the stand" and the communications privilege
"the privilege not to reveal the contents of a particular communication").
41. Schlueter, supra note 5, at 43 ("Under the confidential communications privilege, a witness may take the stand and relate what he observed and what he heard, so
long as what he heard is not confidential.") (footnote omitted).
42. Capra, supra note 5, at 39.
43. See supra note 2.
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An excellent illustration of this confusion is exhibited in the case of
In re Grand Jury.4 4 The case presented three different grand jury appeals, all with parent-child privilege issues.45 In the appeal from the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, the grand jury subpoenaed a father to testify, presumably about conversations with the target of the
grand jury investigation, his eighteen-year-old son.4 6 "[T]he father
moved to quash the subpoena, asserting that those conversations were
privileged from disclosure under Fed. R. Evid. 501."'1 The district
court, although sympathetic to the father's plight, denied the father's
motion to quash because other courts that had addressed the issue,
including the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, failed to recognize the
privilege.4 8 In the appeal from Delaware, "a sixteen year old minor
daughter was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury, as part of
an investigation into her father's participation in an alleged interstate
kidnapping. ' 49 The daughter filed a motion to bar her testimony,
claiming both a parent-child testimonial privilege and a parent-child
confidential communications privilege.5" The district court denied the
order, and the daughter refused to testify.5 1 She was found in contempt for refusing to testify, and she appealed.52 The appellants made
the traditional public policy arguments for the parent-child privilege,53
which the court recognized as having been advanced by many different legal commentators and academicians. 54 The court held that no
parent-child privilege existed for the following reasons:
(1) The overwhelming majority of all courts-federal or statehave rejected such a privilege.
(a) Eight federal Courts of Appeals have rejected such a privilege and none of the remaining Courts of Appeals have recognized such a privilege.
(b) Every state supreme court that has addressed the issue has
rejected the privilege, and only four states have protected
parent-child communications in some manner.
(c) No state within the Third Circuit has recognized a parentchild privilege.
(2) No reasoned analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 or of the
standards established by the Supreme Court or by this court
supports the creation of a privilege.
44. See generally In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997) (illustrating the
overall confusion between parent-to-child and child-to-parent communications).
45. Id. at 1142.
46. Id. at 1142-43.
47. Id. at 1143.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 1143-44.
52. Id. at 1144.
53. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
54. Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1146.
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(3) Creation of such a privilege would have no impact on the parental relationship and hence would neither benefit that relationship nor serve any social policy.
(4) Although we have the authority to recognize a new privilege,
we believe the recognition of such a privilege,
if one is to be
55
recognized, should be left to Congress.
The majority did not address the adverse testimonial privilege,5 6 even
though it was asserted in the Delaware case.5 7 Instead, "[a] divided
court refused to recognize the narrower privilege for confidential
communications between parent and child; implicit in this resolution
'58
is that the broader adverse testimony privilege was rejected as well."
The majority's decision is misleading, however, because the court
failed to distinguish why the federal courts of appeals it cited in the
opinion rejected the parent-child privilege.59 For example, while it is
true that the court of appeals did not recognize the privilege in In re
Erato, that court did acknowledge a possible justification for a privilege relating to minor children:
[H]er case presents a weaker claim for recognition of a parent-child
privilege than might be presented in a case involving a minor child.
At least in that situation the argument would be available that compelling a parent to inculpate a minor child risks a strain on the family relationship that might impair the mother's ability to provide
parental guidance during the child's formative years. However we
might rule in that context, we decline to recognize a parent-child
privilege under the present circumstances. We see no basis for recognizing in federal law a new privilege that would permit a mother
to assert a parent-child privilege to avoid testifying against her adult
son regarding transactions in which she appears to have benefited
from her son's allegedly criminal activity by receiving allegedly stolen assets at a below market value price.6 °
Moreover, with the exception of only one case, 61 each federal court of
appeals case listed in the In re Grand Jury opinion did not involve
parents being compelled to testify against minor children; rather, most
involved situations of teenage or adult children being compelled to
55. Id. at 1146-47.
56. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
57. See Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1.143 ("The motion sought to bar the testimony of
the daughter claiming a parent-child privilege which would cover testimony and confidential communications.") (emphasis added).

58. Daniel J. Capra, A 'New' Privilege: Parent-Child,N.Y. L.J., May 9, 1997, at 3,
3.
59. See Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1147-49 (citing jurisdictions that have not recog-

nized a parent-child privilege as well as distinguishing two cases which have recognized the privilege).

60. In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1993).
61. Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1147 (citing Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.

1985), as refusing to recognize a parent-child privilege).
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testify against their adult parents.62 Additionally, the court's analysis
may have been applicable to the daughter in the Delaware case, but it
was not applicable to the facts of the Virgin Islands case. While "common law is obviously an important factor to consider in determining
whether a parent-child privilege should be recognized under Rule 501,
.. . some court must be the first to establish a 'new' common law
rule."63 By relying on prior case law that generally discusses a parentchild privilege in its broadest sense, instead of focusing on the specific
need for a narrowly tailored privilege covering only those confidential

communications between the child and parent, the court failed to fulfill its duty under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.64 The court should

have recognized the requisite narrow parent-child confidential communications privilege. As long as courts continue to speak of parentchild privileges in general, rather than more narrow and specific

terms, it is unlikely that there will ever be a judicially created parentchild privilege that is narrowly structured to protect only those confidential communications between a child and his parent. The courts
must distinguish between the two different parent-child privileges and
decide, using "reason and experience," 65 to find a narrow parent-child
communications privilege.
In Jaffee v. Redmond,66 the Supreme Court stated that courts are
not to "freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal
62. See id. (citing Erato, 2 F.3d at 16 (refusing to find privilege for adult mother
who had apparently benefited from her adult son's alleged criminal activity); Grand
Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1988) (involving teenager who was being compelled to testify against adult mother); Kaprelian v.
United States, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1.985) (involving the testimony of teenage daughter against adult father); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 428-31 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding
that the parents of teenage son accused of murder could not claim parent-child privilege); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that adult child
must testify against adult parents if subpoenaed); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (involving the testimony of son
against his adult father); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982) (declining to find privilege to allow adult child to refuse to testify against adult father); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 647 F.2d 511, 512-13 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (per
curiam) (refusing to find privilege to prevent child from testifying against mother and
stepfather); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 879, 885 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(holding that drug evidence against adult parents not excluded even though officers
found drugs by bribing defendant's five-year-old child)). Of these cases, Port v. Heard
is the only case that is applicable based on the facts of the Virgin Island proceeding.
63. Capra, supra note 58, at 3.
64. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
66. 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (holding that confidential communications between a
client and her licensed psychiatrist or psychologist, or a licensed social worker in the
course of psychotherapy, is privileged); see also Maureen P. O'Sullivan, Comment, An
Examination of the State and Federal Courts' Treatment of the Parent-ChildPrivilege,
39 CATH. LAW. 201, 217 (1999) (stating that the Jaffee holding is important because
the Supreme Court exercised its power under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to create
a new privilege at common law).
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trials"6 7 but should apply the "open-ended common law approach of
current Rule 501. " 68 The In re Grand Jury court noted this,6 9 yet it
failed to find a parent-child privilege at common law because the Supreme Court and other federal courts have "declined to exercise their
power under Rule 501 expansively."7 0 Thus, while the federal courts
have it within their discretion to find a narrow parent-child confidential communications privilege, most of the courts appear reluctant to
make that decision.
Opponents do not believe that a common law parent-child privilege
should be found. They claim that the "parent-child privilege was not
on the list of privileges sent by the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court in 1972," and thus, was not regarded by the Advisory
Committee to be "sufficiently important to warrant privilege protection. ' 71 This argument is not persuasive. While it "does have some
weight because [the list] was prepared by experts in the field and was
approved by the Supreme Court, 7 2 it was rejected by Congress, and
even as the In re Grand Jury majority noted, many experts still advocate a parent-child privilege.73 In her dissent, Justice Mansmann
stated:
This case ... does not require that we apply the law as it exists
with respect to testimonial privilege. Instead, we are asked to determine what the law in this area ought to be. While most courts have
declined to recognize a parent-child testimonial privilege, they have
done so in contexts far different from the one presented here. I am
convinced that this is an appropriate case
74 in which to recognize and
set parameters for a limited privilege.
7
The In re Grand Jury court
Unfortunately, the majority disagreedY.
concluded that the privilege "would have no impact on the parental
relationship and hence would neither benefit that relationship nor
serve any social policy,"7 6 but that assertion has no empirical data to
support it.77 However, the court's statement that "recognition of such

67. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8-9.
68. Capra, supra note 58, at 36.
69. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1149 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
70. Id.
71. Capra, supra note 58, at 36.
72. Id.
73. See Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1146; Capra, supra note 58, at 36.
74. Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1158 (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting).
While Justice Mansmann uses the terminology "testimonial privilege," she specifies at
the beginning of her dissent that she is referring to "an evidentiary privilege which
could be invoked to prevent compelling that parent to testify regarding confidential
communications made to the parent by his child." Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 1150.
76. Id. at 1147.
77. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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a privilege, if one is to be recognized, should be left to Congress,"78
seems to be an open invitation to legislatures to decide on the matter.
Certainly, a statutory approach to the creation of a parent-child privilege would be a better choice than waiting for the "perfect" case to
compel the courts to decide in favor of a parent-child privilege covering the confidential communications of a minor child to his parent. 9
The truth is that many minors cannot afford the luxury of waiting.
III.

TOUGHER GUIDELINES IN JUVENILE DETENTION AND ADULT
CERTIFICATION PROCEEDINGS:

NEW

FUEL FOR AN

OLD DEBATE

While the traditional arguments for a parent-child privilege 8 ° are
compelling, the fact remains that these arguments have met only limited success. Currently, only New York recognizes a parent-child privilege at common law, 81 and only two states, Idaho and Minnesota,
have laws protecting communications made from the child to the parent. 82 Massachusetts has a law involving parent-child communications,8 3 but it is seen as "backward[ ]" because it allows the parent to
prevent the child from testifying against the parent, but not viceversa.8 4 Perhaps one explanation for the privilege's limited success is
that the lack of a parent-child privilege has simply not been seen as a
widespread problem that demands immediate attention. In 1987, one
opponent stated, "Few prosecutors are willing to incur public wrath
and criticism for needless use of testimony of either a child or a parent
against the other," and "the fear of abuse is simply not sufficiently
8' 5
well-founded to justify the codification of a parent-child privilege.
While no proof was offered for the first of these two assertions, assuming, arguendo, their validity in 1987, the recent trend appears to
be otherwise.8 6
78. Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1147.
79. Need for Parent/Child Privilege, supra note 7, at 10.

80. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
81. See Caher, supra note 1, at 4.
82. IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Michie 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 595.02(1)(j) (West

2000); see Tebo, supra note 1, at 18.
83. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 20 (1986).
84. Sarson, supra note 2, at 871. A bill introduced in the Massachusetts legislature
in 2000 would have extended the privilege to similarly protect the child. E-mail from
Stacey Stein, Aide to Massachusetts Senator Cynthia Stone Creem, to David L.
Cheatham (Jan. 5, 2001, 09:24:52 CST) (on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
The bill passed in the Senate, but died in the House of Representatives before it was
enacted. Id. However, Senator Creem plans to re-introduce the bill during the
2001-2002 session. Id.
85. Schlueter, supra note 5, at 54.
86. See supra note 5.
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Responding to rising juvenile crime, most state legislatures have
taken a "get-tough" approach to juvenile crime.87 As a result, many
states now allow "increased waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to the adult
criminal courts; opening juvenile records for use in later adult criminal
cases; lowering the age of a child subject to juvenile sanctions or
waiver; and providing stiffer punishment[,] ...including terms of incarceration in adult prisons."8 8 "[T]he surge in get-tough laws sending
more juveniles to adult courts has led some prosecutors to seek grand
jury and even criminal court testimony from parents,"89 re-sparking
the parent-child privilege debate.9 0 A Texas court of appeals justice
stated, "In [non-juvenile] cases I can recall parents testifying as State's
witnesses, even in at least one capital case. Prosecutors ...will call
any witness that will help prove their case."9 1 One prosecutor, responding to questions regarding the increased use of the adult certification process, certainly sounded that tenacious when she stated:
We take the position of listening to the victims and the families of
victims, not of the defendants.... There's a lot of anger expressed
about the issue of younger offenders .... For the families [of the
victims,] it's a punishment issue. They see these crimes as being so
heinous that they should be punished and we shouldn't be worried
about the consequences to [the defendants]. 92
Although Monica Lewinsky was not a minor at the time, "[t]he absence of any parent-child privilege became a matter of public and political outcry when Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr subpoenaed
[her] mother to testify before the District of Columbia grand jury."9 3
The case of Amy Grossberg, 94 the teenager accused of killing her newborn child, also drew national attention, and 95
likewise, Grossberg's
parents were subpoenaed to testify against her.
Other cases may not have drawn the national attention of the
Lewinsky investigation or the Amy Grossberg murder trial, but they
nevertheless show the rising trend of minor children facing tougher
juvenile sentencing and adult certification guidelines. For example, at
ages "11 and 13, Nathaniel Abraham and Nathaniel Brazill were too
young to see a standard Hollywood slasher film without adult accompaniment, [b]ut they were old enough, when arrested for murder, to
87. Justice Ed Kinkeade, Appellate Juvenile Justice in Texas-It's a Crime! Or
Should Be, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 17, 20 (1999).
88. Id. (citing Jeffrey A. Butts, Speedy Trial in the Juvenile Court, 23 AM. J.CRIM.

L. 515 (1996)).
89. Tebo, supra note 1, at 18; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
90. See Capra, supra note 5, at 3.
91. E-mail, supra note 5.
92. Connelly, supra note 5, at 2 (quoting the Chief Prosecutor of the Juvenile Division for Harris County, Texas) (second alteration in original).
93. Capra, supra note 5, at 39.
94. State v. Grossberg, No. IN96-12-00127, 1998 WL 117975, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.
Jan. 23, 1998).
95. See Caher, supra note 1, at 4.
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be tried as adults." 9 6 At age seventeen, Douglas Thomas committed
murder.9 7 "In some states, that[] [i]s too young to undergo bodypiercing without parental consent, [but] [i]n Virginia, that was old
enough to send Mr. Thomas on his way to the death chamber., 98 One
attorney who defends juveniles was not surprised when his client, an
eleven-year-old girl found guilty by a juvenile judge of sexually molesting a five-year-old girl, received two years probation and courtordered counseling. 99 He was shocked, however, when "the girl's
name, face and address were posted on a police Web site [as a result
of] a new law that expanded sex offender registration information
available to the public on juveniles as well as adults."' 0 0 In Dallas,
"[a] 15-year-old boy accused of holding his pregnant teacher and 19
classmates hostage" was lucky-he was not certified to stand trial as
an adult. 10 Had he been certified and convicted as an adult, the boy
could have faced up to ninety-nine years in prison. 0 2
Certainly, these kids are no angels. It is difficult, at best, to find
compassion for the "fourteen-year-old Kentucky boy [who] shot and
killed three of his classmates in a school hall as they prayed before
class;"' 3 or the "twelve-year-old twin sixth-graders [who] set fire to
their elementary school so they would have the next Monday off;"'0 4
or the ten and twelve-year-old kids who "pulled the fire alarm of their
elementary school and shot four classmates and a teacher as the students fled from the building.' 1 5 However, these kids are still children,
and all hope of rehabilitation should not be lost.'0 6 While rehabilitating juvenile offenders is difficult, at best, why make rehabilitative ef96. Laws Muddying 'Age of Majority:' Young Face Adult Charges, Teen Rules,
Dec. 5, 2000, at 16A [hereinafter Laws Muddying 'Age of
Majority']. While Nathaniel Abraham faced a possible life sentence, "[t]he judge ...
instead sentenced the boy to youth detention, with release scheduled when he turns
21." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. "Only the United States and Somalia, among all United Nations members,
have not ratified a convention outlawing such executions." Id. (citing an unnamed
Justice Department report).
99. John Council, No More Kid Stuff: The Line Between Juvenile and Adult Crime
Continues to Blur, TEX. LAW., Nov. 8, 1999, at 1 (reporting an interview with Fort
Worth, Texas, attorney Mike Berger).
100. Id. Note that Randy Burton, a child advocate in Houston, Texas, states, "He
believes juvenile sex offenders have usually been sexually assaulted themselves" and
that "young offenders have a chance at being rehabilitated." Id. at 30. Therefore, he
agrees that placing the child's picture and information on the internet makes her "a
target for pedophiles." Id. at 1.
101. Jennifer Emily, Teen in School Hostage Case to Stand Trial as Juvenile: Carrollton Boy Accused of Holding Teacher, Classmates at Gunpoint, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 19, 2000, at 32A.
102. Id.
103. Kinkeade, supra note 87, at 22.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The debate over whether the goal for these children should be rehabilitation
or punishment is beyond the scope of this Comment.
DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
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forts all the more difficult by alienating parents from their children by
forcing parents to divulge confidential communications made to them
by their children?
"Family lawyers say there was no apparent need for a ...privilege
exempting parents from testifying against their kids when most cases
were handled in juvenile court, where the rules of evidence and the
potential consequences for the accused are more relaxed." '
However, many states have recently passed "get-tough" measures for juvenile offenders, allowing more juveniles to be certified to stand trial as
adults as well as imposing tougher penalties on juvenile offenders. 10 8
For example, "[f]or decades, Texas juvenile law ...dealt with children
in a pseudo-criminal fashion" that was more focused "on rehabilitation than branding them as criminals."' 9 In 1995, the Texas Legislature rewrote the laws, "dr[awing] a fine line between juvenile and
adult criminal law."' 0 However, subsequent legislative changes have
blurred this distinction. 1 1' "The key component of the 1995 rewrite
was dropping the adult certification age to 14, while expanding the
length of sentences that could be given in juvenile court to 40
years."' 2 Texas juveniles who are detained 13 for more serious
4
charges face either determinate sentencing or adult certification."
Determinate sentencing involves sending a juvenile to the Texas
Youth Commission. If the child doesn't reform, TYC officials can
ask a court to send the juvenile to an adult prison to serve out the
rest of his term beginning
at age 16. If he's reformed, TYC can also
15
parole the juvenile.'
Adult certifications allow juveniles to be tried in the adult criminal
system and are not uncommon. For example, in Texas, adult "certifications [of minors] jumped from 273 in fiscal 1993 to 715 in fiscal 1994,
according to the Office of Court Administration. '"116 In Harris
County, Texas, alone, 156 juveniles were certified as adults in 1995.' 17
Not only are certifications more common, but also the increase in the
number of hearings on the dockets has greatly shortened the amount
107. Tebo, supra note 1, at 18.
108. Kinkeade, supra note 87, at 20.
109. Council, supra note 99, at 30.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. The Texas juvenile justice system is considered quasi-criminal, rather than
criminal, and thus uses the terminology "detained" rather than "arrested." See id. at
30; Kinkeade, supra note 87, at 20-21.
114. Council, supra note 99, at 30.
115. Id.
116. Connelly, supra note 5, at 2.
117. Id.
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of time each hearing receives." 8 "'Certifications used to be the capital murder of juvenile practice back when I was a juvenile prosecutor
in 1978,' [according to] Houston solo practitioner Wayne Hill ...[but

now,] 'I've been in hearings that lasted an hour and a half." 19 Texas
is not alone in its expeditious handling of juvenile proceedings.
"[J]udges in some states have handled sixty cases a day, which equates
to roughly six minutes per case."' 2 ° Another Houston attorney was
quoted as saying, "'Prosecutors are asking for certification more
[often], and a bigger percentage of those requests are [sic] being
granted."" 2 Hill added, "'It's not only the extremely violent cases or
habitual offenders anymore. I've seen first-time offenders get certified. I've handled cases where it's just amazing that they would seek
certification.' 122 Defense attorneys fear that these certification procedures incarcerate some youths who may have been excellent candi12 3
dates for rehabilitation through the Texas Youth Commission.
Texas may be softening ever so slightly, however. In 1999, the Chief
of the Juvenile Division for the Tarrant County District Attorney's
Office remarked that "'there's been a change in philosophy"' by the
District Attorney, such that whereas prosecutors once would have
sought adult certification in robbery cases involving
a gun, now those
24
cases are receiving determinate sentencing.
If Texas juvenile laws seem harsh, remember that "Texas actually
falls somewhere in the middle when compared to how other states
treat juvenile criminals."'' 25 For example, while Texas allows a fourteen-year-old to be tried as an adult, Oklahoma lowers that age to as
young as seven, and as of 1999, thirty-seven states "d[id] not specify
the lowest age a juvenile [may] be before being certified as an
adult., 126 In California, the law presumes that minors as young as
fourteen who are charged with a felony will be tried as adults. 127 "[I]n
Massachusetts, courts impose a mandatory six-month sentence for
juveniles convicted of carrying an unlicensed firearm. Furthermore,
any juvenile charged or convicted of murder is automatically trans118. Id. (quoting Houston solo practitioner Wayne Hill as stating that certification
proceedings once were time-consuming processes but have now been greatly
streamlined).
119. Id.
120. Kinkeade, supra note 87, at 23 (citing Fox Butterfield, With Juvenile Courts in
Chaos, Some Propose Scrapping Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1997, at Al).
121. Connelly, supra note 5, at 2 (quoting Houston solo practitioner Ronnie
Harrison).

122. Id. (quoting Houston solo practitioner Wayne Hill).
123. Id. at 2.
124. Council, supra note 99, at 30 (quoting Mitch Poe, chief of the juvenile division
for the Tarrant County District Attorney's Office).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Kinkeade, supra note 87, at 29 (citing Summary of Bills Passed in Assembly,
Senate, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1996, at A24).
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ferred to the adult system."'' 2 8 Even more startling, in Massachusetts,
in adult
"[j]uveniles as young as fourteen years of age serve sentences
129
prison if they have a prior record of serious crimes.
With its tough stance on juvenile crime, it makes sense that Massachusetts is one of three states that statutorily recognizes some form of
a parent-child privilege. 3 ' From a logical perspective, however, the
Massachusetts statute seems backward 131 and has actually been called
a "witness disqualification rule. 1' 32 Currently, the Massachusetts statute allows a parent to prevent her child from testifying against her, but
the privilege is not reciprocal. 133 Efforts are underway to change that
injustice. Democratic Senator Cynthia Stone Creem co-sponsored a
measure in 2000 that would "disqualify[] ...parents from testifying
against their unemancipated minor children, except when the victim
of an alleged crime is another household member."' 34 The bill was
introduced in direct response 1 35 to In re Grand Jury Subpoena,36 a
case in Massachusetts's highest court. In that case, involving a sixteen-year-old who was accused of rape, "[t]he justices found no state
parent-child testimonial privilege existed to allow the boy's parents to
quash a prosecutor's grand jury subpoena.' 37 However, the court
continued the stay on the subpoenas, as they related to confidential
communications between the juveniles and their parents, in order to
give the state legislature time to address the issue.1 38 Additionally,
the court "d[id] not preclude the possibility that particular confidential communications may be privileged under the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution or art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights
of the Massachusetts Constitution."' 39 Meanwhile, the proposed bill
passed the Massachusetts Senate, but the House of Representatives
did not take up the issue before the end of the 2000 legislative session;
Creem has re-filed the bill for the 2001-2002 legistherefore, Senator
40
lative session.'
128. Id. at 23 (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119 §§ 58,61 (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp.
2001)).
129. Id. (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119 § 61 (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 2001);
Gabrielle Crist, Juvenile Crime Curbed in Massachusetts, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 13, 1997, at 26A)).
130. See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1146-47 n.13 (3d Cir. 1997).
131. Sarson, supra note 2, at 871 (stating that "[tihe Massachusetts statute, when
viewed in light of the policies underlying [parent-child] privilege .. .is backwards").
132. Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1146-47 n.13.
133. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (West 2000).
134. Tebo, supra note 1, at 18.
135. Id.
136. 722 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. 2000).
137. Tebo, supra note 1, at 18.
138. Grand Jury Subpoena, 722 N.E.2d at 457.
139. Id. at 458 n.17.
140. E-mail, supra note 84.
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Because the "get-tough" trend in the juvenile justice system appears
to be working, 4 ' it should not be abandoned. 4 2 However, the increased ramifications that juvenile offenders face in light of the gettough system greatly increase the need for protecting a parent's role in
the process. For instance, prior to 1995, Texas's role in the juvenile
justice system was that of a "parent," who "was present to rehabilitate
rather than punish," always "act[ing] in the best interest of the
child.' : 43 After legislative reform and the resulting shift in focus from
rehabilitation to the get-tough system, 44 the role of the State as "parent" was abandoned. Because the State is no longer acting in this
quasi-parental capacity, now, more than ever, a parent's role in rehabilitation is crucial. It is a cruel irony that most states do not allow a
narrow parent-child privilege covering only those confidential communications between a troubled child seeking guidance or advice from
her parent. Such
exclusion "seems contrary to the political focus on
1 45
family values."'
One of the early New York cases recognizing a parent-child privilege at common law was In re A & M. 146 The court recognized the
natural importance of the parental role in offering guidance to the
troubled child when it stated:
It would be difficult to think of a situation which more strikingly
embodies the intimate and confidential relationship which exists
among family members than that in which a troubled young person,
perhaps beset with remorse and guilt, turns for counsel and guidance to his mother and father. There is nothing more natural,
than that a
more consistent with our concept of the parental role,
47
child may rely on his parents for help and advice.'
While the court in another New York case, In re Richard W.,148 did
not address the issue of a parent-child privilege, it did recognize the
important role that a parent serves in juvenile delinquency proceed141. See Jennifer Emily, Juvenile Homicide Arrests Show Drop: Dallas County

Figures Reflect U.S. Trend, DALLAS MORNING

NEWS,

Dec. 15, 2000, at 33A (reporting

that "juvenile crime dropped [thirty-six] percent from 1994 to 1999 and is at its lowest
level since 1988"). The newspaper also reported that juvenile homicide arrests in Dallas County, Texas, alone decreased by seventy-five percent since 1993, reflecting a
national trend. Id.
142. But see Laws Muddying 'Age of Majority,' supra note 96 (reporting that West
Virginia Supreme Court Justice Larry Starcher "is dismayed by the get-tough-on-kids
approach," and stating that Justice Starcher believes that courts should not "drop the
ax too early" when dealing with juvenile offenders).
143. Kinkeade, supra note 87, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
144. Id.
145. Tebo, supra note 1, at 18. While Tebo seems to generally support a parentchild privilege, and it might be inferred that she supports legislative approval, nothing
in her Article indicates whether she favors a broad or narrow statute, judicial approval, or both judicial and legislative approvals. Id.
146. In re A & M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
147. Id. at 378.
148. 377 N.E.2d 471 (N.Y. 1978) (per curiam).
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ings.14 9 The In re Richard W. case involved determining the admissi50
bility of a child's voluntary admission of guilt to the prosecutor.1
The child had previously denied the allegations against him, but after
the interrogation ended and the child spoke with his mother for some
time, he asked "to speak with the Assistant District Attorney
'
After being reminded of his rights, and with his mother in
again." 151
his presence, the child confessed his guilt.' 52 In holding that the
child's admission was properly admitted as evidence in his delinquency proceeding, the In re Richard W. court showed great respect
for the parent's role when the court stated:
However extensive may be a parent's right and a minor child's entitlement to the exercise of the responsibilities of parental guidance
and influence .... if it be established that such guidance or influence is not exercised by the parent independently but at the behest
or on behalf of the prosecutor, such circumstance should weigh
heavily to indicate the involuntariness of the child's confession.'"
If it is only natural for a child in trouble to turn to his parents for
advice and guidance,1 54 is it fair to force the parents to breach that
trust via forced testimony about the confidential communications between the parent and the parent's child? The In re A & M court
asked, "Shall it be said to those parents, 'Listen to your son at the risk
of being compelled to testify about his confidences?"' 155 The answer
to that court's rhetorical question must be a resounding "no." As one
father facing a grand jury subpoena to testify against his minor son put
it:
I will be living under a cloud in which if my son comes to me or
talks to me, I've got to be very careful what he says, what I allow
him to say. I would have to stop him and say, "You can't talk to me
about that. You've got to talk 1 to
56 your attorney." It's no way for
anybody to live in this country.
IV.

THE PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE PROPOSALS MUST BE
NARROW IN SCOPE IN ORDER TO GAIN
WIDESPREAD APPROVAL

With many scholars and practitioners calling for the recognition of a
parent-child privilege, why has such recognition gained only limited
success? The primary reason is that most proposals have been overly
149. See id. at 471.
150. In re Richard W., 388 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), affd, 377 N.E.2d
471 (N.Y. 1978) (per curiam).
151. Id.

152. Id.
153. Richard W., 377 N.E.2d at 471.
154. In re A & M, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
155. Id.

156. In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1997).
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broad. 157 For example, a recent bill was proposed to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to include a parent-child privilege. 158 The proposed bill would have allowed for both a "confidential communication
privilege" and "an adverse testimonial privilege" that "would protect
a person subject to a parent-child relationship from testifying ad'
versely to his or her opposite in the relationship."159
While the proposed bill narrowed the scope by providing such a witness the ability
to waive the privilege, 6 ° the addition of the 16adverse
testimonial privi1
lege made the proposal too broad in scope.
As one proponent of parent-child privilege stated, "The sweeping
scope of this privilege as codified in these states, and as proposed by
numerous scholars, seems to explain why state courts and legislatures
[have been] less than eager to create a parent-child privilege., 161 The
Fourth Circuit echoed that sentiment in United States v. Dunford
when it stated, "[E]ven if such a privilege were to be recognized, it
would have to be narrowly defined and would have obvious limits,
perhaps such as where the family fractures itself or the child waives
the privilege or where ongoing criminal activity would be shielded by
assertion of the privilege." 163 Certainly, a review of the vast amount
of scholarly writings on the subject yields no consensus on how narrow
or how broad the privilege should be. 164 For example, "[t]he [New
York State] Law Review Commission, an agency established in 1934
157. Sarson, supra note 2, at 862; see also Jefferson, supra note 11, at 450 (stating
that because it is more limited in scope, "the confidential communications privilege
has a better chance of gaining recognition from legislators and judges" than does the
adverse testimonial privilege).
158. Lawmaker Proposes Bill to Add New Parent-ChildPrivilege, FED. DISCOVERY
NEWS,

Apr. 1999, at 5.

159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See Sarson, supra note 2, at 874-75.
162. Id. at 862 (footnote omitted).
163. United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1998).
164. See generally Booth, supra note 3, at 1195-96 (advocating creation of a parentchild confidential communications privilege in Texas but stating that the privilege

could already exist under the right to privacy in the United States Constitution); Jefferson, supra note 11, at 468 (advocating that the "legislature is the appropriate body
to recognize a parent-child privilege" if such a privilege is to be recognized, and that if
recognized, the privilege should apply only to minor child-to-parent confidential communications and that "parent" should be construed broadly); Sarson, supra note 2, at
876-82 (advocating a narrow parent-child privilege that would cover only confidential
child-to-parent statements, that would only apply in criminal cases, that would only
apply to unemancipated, minor children, and that could be waived by the parent, over
the child's objection); Shah, supra note 37, at 58-59 (advocating a broad, statutorily
created parent-child privilege that would apply to both adverse testimony and confidential communications, that would be reciprocal, allowing both parent and child to
claim the privilege and refuse to testify against the other, and that would apply to
both adult and minor children); Erica Smith-Klocek, Comment, A Halachic Perspective on the Parent-ChildPrivilege, 39 CATH. LAW. 105, 124 (1999) (advocating that
courts and legislatures look to Jewish law to find additional support for recognition of
a parent-child privilege).
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to examine New York statutes and advise the Legislature on areas
where it believes reforms are warranted, has been calling for some
form of child-parent privilege for nearly 20 years."16' 5 When a
lawmaker recently asked the commission to draft a new proposed version of a parent-child privilege, "the commission held a roundtable
[discussion] at Brooklyn Law School, where the issue was debated,
but no clear consensus emerged." 16' 6 One member of the commission,
an Albany Law School professor, commented, "'There were 30 people
there, and there were 32 positions on everything we talked about." 16 7
In New York, "a proposal advanced by the New York State Bar
Association was passed by the State Senate with little discussion and
no fanfare."' 6 8 The measure would have added a bilateral parentchild privilege "in which a parent or child could refuse to testify and
could also prohibit the other side from testifying against them. It contained no age limit - so for the purposes of that bill, once a child,
always a child." 16' 9 Understandably, once the proposal arrived at the
Assembly, the legislation was put on hold. 17 0 Now, the New York
State Law Review Commission's most recent proposal "would create
a unilateral privilege that would prohibit only forced disclosure by either a parent or a child. In other words, if a parent or child wanted to
testify against a child or parent," they could.17 ' While the new, narrower proposal is better than the original Senate bill, it remains overly
broad. There may be some merit to allowing a child to refuse to testify against his or her parent, 72 but due to the much more serious
penalties brought about by the get-tough juvenile sentencing and
adult certification guidelines, it is much more crucial at this juncture
to focus on offering the alleged child-offender the protection of knowing that he may seek the trusted advice of a parent at a time when that
child needs such guidance the most.
The proposal from the National Association of Criminal Defense
71 3
Lawyers also allows the child to refuse to testify against the parent,'
and likewise, faces the same dilemma. According to the association,
the proposal calls for the privilege to cover only confidential communications but extends that privilege to prevent both the parent and the
child from being compelled to testify against the other, subject to an
165. Caher, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Michael J. Hutter).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Jessica Perry, Note, The Parent-ChildTestimonial Privilege: An Argument
for Qualified Recognition, 37 BRANDEiS L.J. 97, 114 (1998) (arguing that "[cireating a
privilege that would only protect communications made from children to parents ...
ignores the potential for psychological harm to a child forced to testify against his or
her parent").
173. See Need for Parent/ChildPrivilege, supra note 7, at 10.
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express waiver by the opposite in the relationship, allowing that person to testify. 74 The parent or child would not be compelled to disclose the confidential communications between the parent and the
child, but the parent or child could permit the other to disclose the
confidential communications. 175 The association also states that the
proposal will "allow the parent or child the option to disclose the communication over the objection of the other.' 1 76 This provision addresses the concern that a parent who wants to testify will be made a
"prisoner of the privilege" if the parent can be prevented from testifying simply by the child invoking the privilege. 177 The association's
proposal strives to strike a balance between protecting the parentchild confidential communications and promoting law enforcement
goals by favoring disclosure, 78 increasing the proposal's opportunity
for adoption. However, by allowing the child to testify over the objection of the parent in a proceeding against the child, it may
rob that
179
parent of her right to control the upbringing of her child.
In order for the parent-child privilege to gain widespread approval
among the vast majority of states that currently do not recognize such
a privilege, some proponents will need to lessen the amount of protection they seek to offer via the privilege. 8 ' Simply put, the proposed
statute in each state will have to be very narrow in scope; otherwise,
there is no hope in the foreseeable future of widespread state
approvals. 8
V. A

PROPOSED STATUTE, NARROWLY TAILORED TO GAIN

WIDESPREAD APPROVAL, YET BROAD ENOUGH TO
FOSTER, NOT DIMINISH, THE PARENTCHILD RELATIONSHIP

While each state legislature will want to tailor its statute to meet the

concerns of constituents and the specific needs of its state, 82 the fol174. Id.

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Capra, supra note 5, at 39.
178. See Need for Parent/Child Privilege, supra note 7, at 10.

179. See generally Booth, supra note 3, at 1181-85 (discussing the constitutional
right to privacy as a possible basis for establishing a parent-child privilege).
180. See Sarson, supra note 2, at 862-63.
181. Id.
182. Compare id. at 877 (stating that one reason the privilege should only apply in
criminal cases is that the constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination extends to criminal but not civil cases), with Kinkeade, supra note 87, at 20-21 (stating
that "the bifurcated system of civil and criminal appeals in Texas still sends juvenile
cases to the Texas Supreme Court rather than the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,"
and that "[a]lthough Texas courts acknowledge the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile
cases ... the courts have steadfastly held that the civil rules of appellate procedure
predominate under section 56.01(a) of the Texas Family Code," such that while
juveniles are now punished much the same as adults are, they are not afforded the
same protections upon appeal as their adult counterparts).
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lowing proposal, based on a modified version of the Idaho parentchild privilege statute,18 3 is offered as a guideline. It is designed to be
narrowly tailored enough to gain widespread approval, yet just broad
enough to foster, not diminish, the parent-child relationship. This encourages state legislatures to enact a parent-child confidential communications privilege statute similar to the following:
Any parent, guardian or legal custodian shall not be forced to disclose any confidential communication made by their minor child or
ward to them concerning matters in any criminal or civil action1 84 to
which such child or ward is a party. Such matters so communicated
shall be privileged and protected from disclosure; excepting, this
section does not apply to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime
committed by violence of the child as against another family or
household member, nor does this section apply if the parent, guardian or legal custodian shall choose, in the best interest of 1the
85 child,
to voluntarily disclose such confidential communications.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While juveniles may be committing "adult" crimes that warrant
"adult" punishments, the fact remains that these juveniles are still minor children who need adult guidance, especially when facing a system
with such harsh, life-changing consequences. Because the goal of the
juvenile justice system has increasingly moved from rehabilitation of
the juvenile offender to mere punishment and incarceration, the parent's role in the child's rehabilitation has become even more crucial.
Thus, the parent-child relationship should be fostered by promoting
open communication and trust between the parent and her child, not
diminished by allowing an overly zealous prosecutor to force a parent
to divulge those confidential communications and destroy the child's
trust. After all, it is only natural for a child in trouble to turn to her
parent, as the child has few other viable options. Due to the present
get-tough philosophy toward juvenile offenders, recognition of a parent-child confidential communications privilege is urgently needed so
these juveniles can have the benefit of adult guidance at a time when
these minor children need it the most.
While historical arguments for a parent-child privilege have been
strong, the privilege has not gained widespread approval because most
proposals have been overly broad. Therefore, proponents of the parent-child privilege should seek passage in their states' legislatures of
only those narrowly tailored statutes that cover parent-child confidential communications. By seeking these narrowly tailored proposals
now, while the need for such protection is at its greatest, proponents
183. See IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Michie 1998).
184. See supra note 182.

185.

IDAHO CODE

§ 9-203(7).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

23

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 8 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 5

416

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

have the best opportunity to see the long overdue parent-child privilege finally gain the widespread recognition it deserves.
David L. Cheatham
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